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Abstract 
Andy Rose (2000), followed by many others, has used the gravity model of bilateral trade on 
a large data set to estimate the trade effects of monetary unions among small countries. The 
finding has been large estimates: Trade among members seems to double or triple, that is, to 
increase by 100-200%. After the advent of EMU in 1999, Micco, Ordoñez and Stein and others 
used the gravity model on a much smaller data set to estimate the effects of the euro on trade 
among its members. The estimates tend to be statistically significant, but far smaller in 
magnitude: on the order of 10-20% during the first four years. What explains the discrepancy?    
This paper seeks to address two questions. First, do the effects on intra-euroland trade that 
were estimated in the euro’s first four years hold up in the second four years? The answer is 
yes. Second, and more complicated, what is the reason for the big discrepancy vis-à-vis other 
currency unions? We investigate three prominent possible explanations for the gap between 
15% and 200%. First, lags. The euro is still very young. Second, size. The European countries 
are much bigger on average than most of those who had formed currency unions in the past.  
Third, endogeneity of the decision to adopt an institutional currency link. Perhaps the high 
correlations estimated in earlier studies were spurious, an artefact of reverse causality.  
Contrary to expectations, we find no evidence that any of these factors explains a substantial 
share of the gap, let alone all of it.    
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The Estimated Trade Effects of the Euro: 
Why Are They Below Those From Historical 
Monetary Unions Among Smaller Countries? 
 
1. Introduction 
Andrew Rose’s 2000 paper, “One Money, One Market…” was perhaps the most 
influential international economics paper of the last ten years. Applying the gravity 
model to a data set that was sufficiently large to encompass a number of currency 
unions led to an eye-opening finding:  members of currency unions traded with each 
an estimated three times as much as with otherwise-similar trading partners. Even if 
he had not included the currency union dummy, this paper would still have been 
important, because he had bilateral exchange rate variability on the list of variables 
explaining bilateral trade, and it was highly significant statistically.1 But the 
attention-grabber was that the currency union dummy had a far larger, and highly 
significant effect – the famous tripling estimate -- above and beyond the effect of 
bilateral variability per se. The Rose paper was of course motivated by the coming of 
EMU in 1999, even though estimates were necessarily based on historical data from 
(much smaller) countries who had adopted currency unions in the past.    
 
2. First post-1999 results on effects of the euro on   
    European trade patterns 
By roughly the five year mark, 2004, enough data had accumulated to allow an 
analysis of the early effects of the euro on European trade patterns. The general 
                                                        
1 The finding that a fixed exchange rate in itself also produces a statistically significant increase in 
bilateral trade has more recently been confirmed by Klein & Shambaugh (2006). 
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finding was that bilateral trade among euro members had indeed increased 
significantly, but that the effect was far less than the one that had been estimated by 
Rose on the larger data set of smaller countries. Micco, Ordoñez and Stein (2003) 
found in a data set of European countries that trade between pairs of the first 12 
EMU-joiners rose significantly between 1999 and 2002, an estimated 15 % beyond 
what could be explained by growth and other factors. The estimates of the euro effect 
in a larger set of 22 industrialized countries ranged from 6 to 26 %, depending on 
dummies. The authors expressed a preference for estimates that allowed for pair 
dummies, and produced a somewhat smaller estimate of the effect: 4-16 %.2 These 
magnitudes were less than in the Rose studies. As the authors pointed out, however, 
the effects were both statistically significant and also economically important, which 
is not bad considering that the sample covered only the first four years of the EMU, a 
period in which the euro did not even circulate in currency form.    
Other evidence from the first five years confirmed the finding. Bun and Klaassen 
(2002, p.1) updated gravity estimates and found that “the euro has significantly 
increased trade, with an effect of 4% in the first year” and a long-run effect projected 
to be about 40 percent.  Flam and Nordström (2006) found an effect of 26% in the 
change from 1995-98 to 2002-05. Berger and Nitsch (2005) and De Nardis and 
Vicarelli (2003) reported similarly positive results. More recently, Chintrakarn (2008) 
finds that two countries sharing the euro have experienced a boost in bilateral trade 
between 9 and 14%.  Overall, the central tendency of these estimates seems to be an 
effect in the first few years on the order of 10-15%.3   
Thus the trade effects of monetary union are not entirely limited to small countries.   
But they are far smaller than the tripling estimated by Rose.  The central questions of 
                                                        
2 Earlier, the preferred Micco, Ordoñez and Stein (2002) estimates of “differences in differences” 
showed that between 1992 and 2001 the boost to intra-EMU trade was about 18 to 35 percent, 
depending on whether using country-pair dummies, or conditioning on the standard gravity 
variables. 
3 Studies with price data have tended to be more mixed, but some confirm that the euro is 
facilitating arbitrage among the markets of member countries. Looking at price data across pairs 
of European cities, Rogers (2001, 2002) finds evidence of convergence, but in the 1990s.  In the 
European auto market, Goldberg, Koujianou, and Verboven (2001) find gradual convergence over 
the period 1970–2000.   Goldberg and Verboven (2004) nail down EMU, per se, as a significant 
determinant of this convergence.  Other positive findings come from Allington, Kattuman and 
Waldman (2005) and Parsley and Wei  (2001b).  Engel and Rogers (2004) are more negative.  
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this chapter are (1) what are the estimated effects, updated at the ten year mark, and 
(2) assuming they are similar to the 10-15% effects estimated by the early studies of 
euroland, what explains the large gap between the euro estimates and the tripling 
effects estimated by Rose and others using much larger historical data sets? Is it a 
matter of lags, so that the 10-15% can be expected to rise gradually over time, 
eventually reaching levels comparable with those estimated for currency unions that 
have been around for 100 years? Or is the currency union effect systematically 
smaller for large countries than for small countries? Or is the tripling among smaller 
countries, merely an artefact of estimation problems associated with endogeneity 
and omitted variables? Finally, is there some effect (or lack thereof) peculiar to 
Europe? 
 
3. The Critiques 
Rose’s remarkable tripling estimate has by now been replicated in various forms 
many times.  But no sooner had he written his paper than the brigade to “shrink the 
Rose effect”4  – or to make it disappear altogether -- descended en masse. These 
critiques sometimes read to me as “guilty until proven innocent.”        
It is understandable that a threefold effect was greeted with much scepticism, as this 
is a very large number. There are five grounds for scepticism, as I classify them. Each 
of these arguments is potentially potent in the context of assessing the euro’s effect 
on European trade patterns, if for no other reason than the claims that the Rose 
finding has always been spurious. But the critiques need to be assessed.   
The first critique is the proposition that one cannot necessarily infer from cross-
section evidence what would be the effect in real time of countries adopting a 
common currency. Most pre-1999 members of currency unions had essentially never 
                                                        
4 The phrase is from Richard Baldwin (2006). Baldwin’s survey of the critiques concludes in the 
end that there is a Rose effect, but that it is probably substantially smaller than a tripling. That is 
fine with me. If Rose had come up with a 50% effect on trade from the beginning, everyone would 
have considered that very large and important. 
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had their own national currencies, but instead used an external currency at least 
since independence. In such cases as Panama or most of the CFA countries in Africa, 
the currency arrangement goes back more than a century. In other cases, such as the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Area, the currency dates from post-war independence.    
Second are allegations of missing variables. The statistical association between cur-
rency links and trade links might not be the result of causation running from 
currencies to trade but might arise instead because both sorts of links are caused by a 
third factor, such as colonial history, remaining political links, complementarity of 
endowments, or accidents of history. Another alleged missing variable is a country’s 
“multilateral resistance” to trade or a more specific measure of remoteness from the 
rest of the world. 
The third critique also concerns causality: the endogeneity of the currency decision.   
Countries choose as partners for currency links the neighbours with whom they 
trade the most, rather than the other way around. Perhaps the endogeneity of the 
currency union decision, and the simultaneity of other regional trade-promoting 
forces, have been stronger among developing countries than among European 
countries. In other words much of the correlation observed for currency unions 
among other countries may be spurious.   
Fourth, the estimated effect on trade simply seems too big to be believable. While this 
judgment is explicitly a gut-reaction, it is widely shared. Furthermore, an influential 
argument by Van Wincoop, to the effect that the question has been mis-parame-
terized and that the true effects are substantially smaller, seems to support it. 
Fifth, Rose’s evidence came entirely from countries that were either small (e.g., 
Ireland, Panama) or very small (e.g., Kiribati, Greenland, Mayotte). Thus it was not 
clear that the estimates could be extended to larger countries. European economies 
tend to be large – some, particularly Germany, very large – while the set of non-EMU 
currency union countries tends to be small, some of them very small. If the currency 
union effect is substantially more important in small highly trade-dependent 
countries, that could readily explain the small estimates for Europe.    
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While each of these five arguments has some validity, to each there is a better 
response than one might expect.  
 
4. Times series dimension 
First, regarding the time dimension, a logical interpretation is that, even if the full 
comparative statics effect were to obtain in the very long run after a change in 
regime, they might not show up in the short run, due to very substantial lags. That 
would not be surprising, as we have evidence of long lags in effects on bilateral 
trade. 
Even 30 years may not be the long run effect. The effect may keep rising for a long 
time. Panama reports sending more than half its exports to the United States; 
perhaps one reason is that it has been on the US dollar for over a hundred years. 
We know that other gravity influences leave an effect on bilateral trade many 
decades after the cause has been removed. One piece of evidence is the slow speed of 
adjustment in general estimated in models with lags.5 Another important example is 
the effect that colonial relationships have even decades after independence, and even 
after controlling for continuing linguistic, political, or other links. Consider as an 
illustration a trivia question: what is Congo’s largest trading partner? Not one of its 
neighbours, nor a large country, as the simple gravity model would lead you to 
expect; it is Belgium, the old colonial master, with whom ties were abruptly severed 
50 years ago.6 Even when the original reason for a high level of bilateral trade has 
disappeared, the stock of capital that firms have invested in the form of marketing 
and distribution networks, brand-name loyalty among customers, and so forth, lives 
on for many years thereafter. The word hysteresis is sometimes applied to this 
phenomenon, suggesting that the effect is considered to be permanent.   
                                                        
5  Eichengreen and Irwin (1998). Frankel (1997) discusses lagged effects historically for the cases 
of FTAs and political unions.   
6  Kleiman (1976) finds that about one-quarter of the (2- to 4-fold) bias of colonial times remains 
for countries that have been independent for two decades. Anderson and Norheim find longer 
lags in the effects of colonial status. Wang and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) 
find significant effects for UK ex-colonial relationships (though not French) as late as 1984-86.    
The Estimated Trade Effects of the Euro 
 
 
6 
Subsequent research on currency unions using time-series data finds that a 
substantial share of the tripling that Rose had estimated from the cross-section data, 
which is presumably the long-run effect, shows up within a few decades of a change. 
Using a 1948–1997 sample that includes a number of countries which left currency 
unions during that period, Glick and Rose (2002) find that trade among the members 
was twice as high in the currency union period as afterward. This suggests that 
roughly two-thirds of the tripling effect may be reached within three decades of a 
change in regime. (This reasoning assumes symmetry with respect to entry into and 
exit from currency unions.)   
 
5. Omitted variables 
The second objection concerns the possible influence of omitted factors. Rose in fact 
did a thorough job of controlling for common languages, colonial history, and 
remaining political links.7 The large estimated effect of a common currency remains. 
It seems very possible that there remain other omitted factors (including accidents of 
history) that influence both currency choices and trade links. Nevertheless, Rose’s 
various extensions of the original research—these robustness tests together with the 
time-series results (Glick and Rose) and the common use of fixed effects —reduce 
some of the force of this critique. 
The omitted variable that is probably of greatest concern to the critics comes from the 
influential Anderson-Van Wincoop paper, and is usually called “multilateral 
resistance term”.8  More concretely, in a cross-section context, the variable may come 
down to “remoteness.” A country’s remoteness is defined as average distance from 
all trading partners, a weighted average based on the sizes of the trading partners; it 
is expected to have a positive effect on trade between a pair of countries, controlling 
                                                        
7  While it is admirable how many factors Rose controls for, I agree with Baldwin and also Melitz 
(2001) in regarding as a “nuisance” Rose’s persistent habit of calling these “nuisance 
parameters.” These coefficients are of interest in their own right, and also help gauge the 
persuasiveness of the overall model. 
8  Baldwin wants to call it the “relative prices matter” term. It could also be called the “general 
equilibrium” term. 
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for the more obvious negative effect of the distance between them bilaterally. 
Baldwin and Van Wincoop are a bit fanatical on this point: anyone who omits the 
relevant terms is not fit to be received in polite society.9 
The Anderson-Van Wincoop (2001) model is an important contribution, both as 
theoretical foundation for the gravity model and in offering an argument that some 
of the border effects may have been quantitatively over-estimated. Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001) find that taking multilateral resistance and trade-diversion into 
account should, a priori, knock the estimated value of the euro on bilateral trade 
down from tripling to 58% (among the original euro members).But the model’s 
insistence on the role of trade-diversion may be too doctrinaire. If I understand 
correctly the aspect of the Anderson-van Wincoop theory that leads to numerical 
estimates of the effects of borders and currencies that are sharply reduced in 
magnitude, it is the property that the elimination of borders or currency differences 
within a region theoretically entails substantial diversion of trade away from the rest 
of the world and thus an increase in multilateral resistance. But such trade-diversion 
from currency unions, whatever its basis in theory, is not observed in the data, by 
and large.10 Thus the argument for imposing the constraints from this particular 
theory may not be as strong as it otherwise would be. Furthermore, even if one goes 
along with van Wincoop in imposing the constraint, the currency union term appa-
rently remains high (1) compared to its standard error, (2) compared to what we all 
thought ten years ago, and (3) compared to what happens to the FTA term when it 
too is knocked down by imposing the van Wincoop constraint. 
 
 
                                                        
9  I am one of those who long ago included remoteness in some of my gravity estimates (though 
not all). I devoted two pages to the subject in Frankel (1997, 143-144), and noted that it 
sometimes makes a difference to the results. The resistance to Canadian-U.S. trade is an example 
where it makes a difference:  Wei (1996) found that controlling for remoteness helped knock 
down the home country bias from around 10 to around 3.   Another may be the finding of a huge 
apparent effect of Pacific Islanders adopting the Australian dollar, in Nitsch (2001).   
10 For example, the UK does not appear to have lost trade to euroland as a result of the euro.  
Begg, et al (2003), Frankel and Rose (2002), Frankel (2003), Micco, Ordoñez and Stein (2003), 
and Chintrakarn (2008).     
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6. Causality problems 
The endogeneity of a country’s choice of exchange regime is perhaps the most intrac-
table problem with the Rose-style estimates. After all, optimum currency area theory 
suggests that countries should peg if they are small and open, and should peg to the 
partners with which they trade a lot.11 El Salvador decided to adopt the dollar 
because it traded a lot with the United States, rather than the other way around.  In 
that case the Rose finding would be spurious. Controlling for exogenous third factors 
such as colonial history is a partial correction, but not a complete one, because they 
don’t completely determine trade patterns.   
One might reasonably ask why the same logic would not apply equally to the 
decisions by European countries to join the euro. Clearly the countries that have been 
most firmly committed to European monetary integration from the beginning (say, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) have been those that were the most 
thoroughly integrated with each other anyway. Those that have stayed out tend to be 
those that are less integrated. If this is enough to produce a tripling in the context of 
other countries, why is the estimated effect so low in Europe?    
Many of the critiques of the Rose results, after pointing out a problem of omitted 
variables or endogeneity or one of the other legitimate problems, offer a purported 
way to address it and then report that the currency union effect disappears.12 My 
own view is that many of these responses in effect throw out most of the data in the 
name of addressing the (correctly emphasized) issues of endogeneity or country size.  
Or they do something similar: put in a great many dummy variables or fixed effects, 
often one for every pair of countries. This approach seems these days to be consi-
dered not just good econometric practice, but essential; we are told that we are not 
allowed so much as a peek at evil studies that neglect to do this. But my view is that 
since the finding of statistical significance arose only when Rose put together a large 
                                                        
11 McKinnon (1963). 
12 See Rose (2001) for a reply to one, and his Web site 
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm#CUTrade) for more.  
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enough data set for it to show up,13 there is not that much information gained in 
reducing the data set sharply and then noticing the loss in statistical significance.   
Most of the statistical power lies in the cross-country variation.  Throw that out, and 
one may be left with little.14 
That said, the complete bilateral data set is so large and the statistical relationship is 
so strong that there is some firepower to spare, and it is worth using some of it to try 
to get at the problems of endogeneity and missing variables. Including fixed effects 
for countries and/or years has become standard. The results generally hold up.   
Adding fixed effects for pairs of countries in the basic specification is a bit more 
problematic, though reasonable as a test for robustness. Rose (2001) himself tried 
adding pair fixed effects to his original data set, and found that the currency union 
dummy lost all significance, while pointing out that it is hard to see how it could 
have been otherwise, since all the action is in the bilateral cross-section. The same 
with Pakko and Wall (2001). Klein (2002), who deliberately focuses on US bilateral 
data alone, is one of many examples of throwing out enough data until the results 
become insignificant. Persson (2001) is another, despite the virtues of the matching 
estimator. When Rose tries Persson’s matching estimator on a larger data set, he 
finds a significant (though smaller) effect (2.6.3).    
More persuasive still is a before-and-after study such as Glick and Rose. It eliminates 
the problem that Panama has always (since independence) been on the dollar 
because it has always traded with the US, much as Luxembourg has always had a 
currency union with Belgium (at least since the Latin Monetary Union of 1865), 
because it has always traded with Belgium. Rather these results show that when a 
country enters or leaves a currency link, its bilateral trade responds accordingly. But 
none of this is to deny that endogeneity remains a likely problem. For example, an 
evolution in trade patterns may come first, with the currency decision following. In 
theory, Ireland may have switched its currency allegiance from British to the 
                                                        
13 Earlier gravity studies had not found major evidence of currency link effects on bilateral trade, 
presumably because the data sets were too small to include many examples of countries with 
institutionally fixed exchange rates:  Thursby and Thursby (1987), DeGrauwe (1988), Brada and 
Mendez (1985), and Frankel and Wei (1993, 1995, 1997).      
14 Frankel (1990). 
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continent in response to shifting trade patterns rather than as a cause of them. 
Attempting to deal with the endogeneity problem should be a priority. 
 
7. Implausible magnitude of the estimate 
Fourth, although those who claim that the tripling number is too large to sound 
plausible have a point, they tend to neglect two counterarguments.  In the first place, 
the estimated effect of currency unions is on the same order of magnitude as the 
estimated effects of FTAs or, if anything, larger. 15 When one applies some of the 
variant estimation strategies, such as the Rose-van Wincoop re-parameterization, so 
that the estimated effect of currency unions falls, the estimated effects of regional 
trading arrangements tend to fall in tandem. The point estimates, significance levels, 
and necessary methodological qualifications, are comparable across the two kinds of 
unions: FTAs and currency unions. In the second place, the estimated effects of 
currency unions are almost as big as the famous estimated effects of borders (home 
bias), e.g., in the Canada-US context, which is at least as big as a factor of three.16   
This home bias is surprising, but is a fact of life. Something needs to explain it, and 
there are not very many candidates other than exchange rate variability. Thus the 
Rose findings remain a challenge to the traditional views of international economists, 
who believed that trade barriers were far more important than either currency 
differences or other remaining barrier frictions.   
 
 
                                                        
15 Baldwin cites approvingly an assertion of Berger & Nitsch (2005)  that it is implausible, even 
crazy, to think that the trade effect of the euro could be as large as the trade effect of EU.   But this 
finding is common econometrically.  If critics were to apply the same tough standards to both 
customs unions and currency unions, they would likely find the estimated magnitude at least as 
large in the latter case as in the former.   As traditionally specified, this is a tripling.    
16 McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1998), Wei (1996), and Nitsch (1990, 1991). 
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8. Country size 
The fifth critique was the claim that the result from pre-1999 currency unions are 
relevant only for small countries, which are highly trade dependent, but are less 
relevant for larger countries such as those in Europe. A partial response has been 
possible all along: there has been no evidence of the monetary union effect varying 
with size, within the available sample. But if one suspects a threshold effect, above 
which the monetary union effect diminishes, and one posits that euro members are 
the first to be big enough to lie above that threshold, then this could explain the gap.   
The question whether the largest economies are truly different can only be answered 
with data from those countries. Fortunately, the euro experiment is now ten years 
old, and so we should hope to be able to answer the question. But to do so we will 
have to expand our view beyond the sort of data set used by Micco, Ordoñez and 
Stein, which was limited to European countries or at most to the set of industrialized 
countries, and to nest it within the larger sort of data set used by Rose, which 
captures trade among all countries. 
 
9. Econometric investigation of the euro-Rose gap in  
    estimated effects 
The tasks addressed in the remainder of this paper are, first, to confirm that the 
effects of the euro to date, even if statistically significant, are still relatively small, 
even with the addition of the several extra years of data that are now available, and 
second, and more importantly, to try to explain the gap. Three candidate explana-
tions for the gap are the most obvious possibilities: 
• Time is needed for gradual adjustment. 
• Currency union effects for large countries are fundamentally different from 
those for small countries. 
The Estimated Trade Effects of the Euro 
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• Earlier estimates from pre-1999 samples of currency unions were biased 
upward by endogeneity. 
 
10. Reproduction of findings for early euro years; jumping     
      the gun 
We begin by reproducing the results in Micco, Ordoñez and Stein (2002), who esti-
mated the effect of the euro on trade patterns for a relatively narrow sample: Europe 
(or, alternatively, all industrialized countries ) during the period 1992-2002. Table 1 
does successfully replicate the results: pairs of euro countries enjoy greater bilateral 
trade, with a coefficient that first appears suddenly significant in 1998, and then 
gradually rises in level and significance, through 2002. 
Table 1 
Recreation of estimated effects on bilateral trade patterns in the first three 
years of the euro 
 
15
Re-creation of Micco, Stein & Ordonez (2003)
on their original data sample and methodology
Micco, Ordonez & Stein (2003): EMU Impact on Trade - Data from 1992 - 2002. 
Includes Year and Country-Pair Fixed Effects.
Developed Sample EU Sample
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
EMU2 - 1993 -0.0176 0.0331 -0.0068 0.0295
EMU2 - 1994 0.0377 0.0337 0.0246 0.0296
EMU2 - 1995 0.0512 0.0340 0.0162 0.0297
EMU2 - 1996 0.0359 0.0345 0.0000 0.0296
EMU2 - 1997 0.0443 0.0350 0.0175 0.0296
EMU2 - 1998 0.0981 0.0358 *** 0.0637 0.0296 **
EMU2 - 1999 0.1166 0.0360 *** 0.0731 0.0297 ** 
EMU2 - 2000 0.1036 0.0367 *** 0.0762 0.0300 ***
EMU2 - 2001 0.1351 0.0369 *** 0.1662 0.0298 ***
EMU2 - 2002 0.1544 0.0368 *** 0.1644 0.0297 ***
Log of Product of Real GDPs 1.1382 0.0464 *** 1.0620 0.0520 ***
Free Trade Agreement -0.0097 0.0188 0.0453 0.0300
EU 0.0095 0.0239 -0.0470 0.0467
EU Trend -0.0008 0.0014 -0.0013 0.0035
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.1737 0.0453 *** -0.1872 0.0627 ***
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.2643 0.0518 *** 0.3738 0.0885 ***
Observations 2541 1001
Within R
2
0.462 0.671
Between R
2
0.686 0.784
Overall R
2
0.684 0.783
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
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16
Finding: € effect reached 14-18% by 2001
Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003): EMU Impact on Trade
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Why does the effect show up in 1998, the year before EMU? It is likely that currency 
unions, much as FTAs, can start to have substantial effects on trade patterns even 
before they have formally gone into effect. This pattern is familiar pattern in the 
data.17 The most obvious interpretation is that once the negotiations, which typically 
have been going on for many years, are far enough along that the union appears very 
likely to take place, businessmen move quickly to try to establish a position in what 
is expected to be a large new market opportunity, perhaps to get a “first mover 
advantage.” This argument works best, theoretically, in the case of markets destined 
for imperfect competition. But even in perfectly competitive markets, firms might 
want to get started early if there are transition costs associated with rapid investment 
in a new market.   
Baldwin (section 5.1) regards as suspicious the striking fact that the estimated effect 
in euroland appears suddenly in 1998, even though EMU did not take effect until 
January 1999. Even allowing the principle that business perceptions of imminent 
monetary union can set the date, rather than waiting for 1999, he claims “right up to 
                                                        
17 E.g., Frankel (1997). 
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March 1998, skeptics doubted that monetary union would be a reality.” But statistics 
from financial markets tend to identify June 1997 as the breakpoint in perceptions.18  
So it is plausible that businesses had started reacting in a measurable way by 1998. 
Next we updated the results, since another four years of data have become available.    
We find that the effect of the euro on bilateral trade remains highly significant 
statistically during the years 2003-2006, but that the point estimate is no longer rising.  
Rather, it appears to have leveled off at approximately 0.1, still very far below the 
Rose estimates of doubling or tripling. In the EU-only sample, the coefficient on 
intra-euroland trade rises to a highly significant estimated level of .13-.16 in 2001-02, 
but does not rise any further in 2003-06. In the sample that includes all developed 
countries, the euro effect becomes significant in 2003, at .11, but does not continue its 
upward trend during 2004-2006. (See Table 2.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 On June 15, 1997, implied probabilities of joining Germany in EMU in 1999 were 100% for 
Belgium and France and over 70% for Finland, Spain and Portugal (calculations from JP Morgan 
based on spreads in the interest rate swap market).   A similar statistic from Goldman Sachs on 
the probability of EMU taking place on January 1, 1999, shot up above 75% after the Stability 
Pact was agreed in June 1997.    
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Table 2:   
Update of Table 1 –  creation of estimated effects on bilateral trade patterns in 
the first eight years of the euro 
17
Update: € effect continues strong, 2001-2006
EMU Impact on Trade - Includes Data from 1992 - 2006. 
Includes Year and Country-Pair Fixed Effects.
Developed Sample EU Sample
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
EMU2 - 1993 -0.0489 0.0457 -0.0137 0.0352
EMU2 - 1994 -0.0297 0.0463 -0.0060 0.0352
EMU2 - 1995 -0.0258 0.0458 -0.0113 0.0352
EMU2 - 1996 -0.0300 0.0461 -0.0132 0.0352
EMU2 - 1997 -0.0138 0.0464 0.0007 0.0352
EMU2 - 1998 0.0315 0.0463 0.0453 0.0352
EMU2 - 1999 0.0205 0.0468 0.0707 0.0358 **
EMU2 - 2000 -0.0064 0.0469 0.0719 0.0358 **
EMU2 - 2001 0.0650 0.0469 0.1621 0.0355 ***
EMU2 - 2002 0.0698 0.0469 0.1306 0.0354 ***
EMU2 - 2003 0.1102 0.0469 ** 0.1334 0.0354 ***
EMU2 - 2004 0.1160 0.0467 *** 0.1507 0.0354 ***
EMU2 - 2005 0.0940 0.0469 ** 0.1385 0.0354 ***
EMU2 - 2006 0.0806 0.0481 * 0.1450 0.0354 ***
Log of Product of Real GDPs 0.6623 0.0378 *** 0.4090 0.0341 ***
Free Trade Agreement 0.0066 0.0163 -0.0669 0.0232 ***
EU (dropped) (dropped)
EU Trend 0.0000 0.0017 -0.0019 0.0015
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.0184 0.0032 *** 0.0006 0.0029
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.0004 0.0027 0.0074 0.0024 ***
Observations 2850 1170
Within R 2 0.998 0.999
Between R
2
0.650 0.804
Overall R 2 0.920 0.929
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
11. Effect of size 
Table 3 investigates whether the effects of monetary union diminish with the size of 
the countries involved. It adds an interactive size term, computed as the product of 
the sizes of the respective countries and the dummy variable for currency union 
membership. The intent is to explore the hypothesis that currency union effects on 
trade are bigger for small countries than for large countries, and that this might 
explain the relatively smaller effect in Europe. It is true that larger countries ex-
perience smaller boosts to intra-MU trade: the interactive term is statistically 
significant. But the effect is still not significant within non-EMU monetary unions.   
Rather it appears within EMU. (The effect of EMU on bilateral trade remains, even 
after controlling for size.). We need to imbed the sample of European or industria-
lized countries within a more comprehensive set of countries before we can pass 
judgment on the claim that size explains the difference in effects.    
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Table 3 
CU effect diminishes with size only within EMU, but not among other countries 
21
With Currency Union and EMU Dummies, Interaction Variable between Currency Union and Country Size 
and Elapsed Time Variables. With Year Fixed Effects. Based on 1948 - 2006 Data.
Log of Bilateral Trade OLS Fixed Effects
Gravity Estimates (Country-Pair FE)
Currency Union (CU) 1.1778 -2.8473 ***
(2.5491) (0.5906)
EMU 15.3995 ** (dropped)
(7.5823)
CU * Log Product of Real GDPs -0.0172 0.0655 ***
(0.0550) (0.0132)
EMU * Log Product of Real GDPs -0.2695 * 0.0186
(0.1539) (0.0310)
Log Distance -0.8772 *** 0.3096 ***
(0.0456) (0.0106)
Log Product Real GDPs 0.7458 *** 0.1045 ***
(0.0123) (0.0169)
Log Product Real GDP/Capita 0.0242 1.0935 ***
(0.0151) (0.0160)
Common Language 0.2589 *** -0.0407 **
(0.0746) (0.0179)
Common Land Border 0.0746 *** -0.4764 ***
(0.1854) (0.0504)
Regional FTA Membership 0.4199 *** 0.0079
(0.1669) (0.0384)
# Landlocked -0.4382 *** 0.2127 ***
(0.0642) (0.0152)
Area -0.1048 *** -0.1123 ***
(0.0114) (0.0024)
Common Colonizer 0.4360 *** 0.0715 ***
(0.1306) (0.0285)
Current Colony / Colonizer 1.7076 *** 0.4120 ***
(0.4883) (0.0976)
Ever Colony / Colonizer 0.0731 -1.1098 ***
(0.1189) (0.0407)
Common Country 2.4202 (dropped)
(3.2544)
Intercept -23.2333 *** -6.7655 ***
(0.5598) (0.6212)
Observations 297,322 297,322
R2: OLS 0.4955
R2: within 0.6868
R2: between 0.0911
R2: overall 0.2861
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
Standard errors recorded in parentheses (for OLS regression, standard errors are robust to country-pair clustering). 
Annual data for 217 countries from 1948 to 2006.  
 
Table 3A 
The Effect of Currency Unions on Trade: Does Size Matter?
1948 - 2006, Fixed Effects Estimator with Countrypair Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Trade
Currency Union 2.661**
(1.092)
Currency Union x Log of Product of Real GDPs -0.041*
(0.021)
Free Trade Agreement 0.113
(0.069)
Log of Product of Real GDPs -1.612***
(0.018)
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita 2.979***
(0.024)
Currently in Colonial Relationship 1.032
(0.815)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 0.068***
(0.005)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 0.134***
(0.012)
Constant 32.558***
(0.587)
Observations 168,174
Number of id 10,739
R-squared 0.09
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3B 
The Effect of Currency Unions on Trade: Does Size Matter?
1948 - 2006, Fixed Effects Estimator with Countrypair and Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Trade
Currency Union 1.887*
(1.064)
Currency Union x Log of Product of Real GDPs -0.021
(0.021)
Free Trade Agreement 0.436***
(0.068)
Log of Product of Real GDPs 0.127***
(0.044)
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita 1.484***
(0.042)
Currently in Colonial Relationship 0.811
(0.794)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.029***
(0.005)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 0.073***
(0.012)
Constant -28.055***
(1.534)
Observations 168,174
Number of id 10,739
R-squared 0.14
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
12. Imbedding euro estimates in larger sample of countries  
      and time 
To try to nail down the gap between the euro estimates of a 10-15% effect and the 
Rose-style estimates of a tripling, it is necessary to imbed the euro data set inside an 
updated version of the larger cross-country data sets employed by Rose and others.   
Micco, Stein and Ordonez, like some of their competitors, looked only at a set of 
European countries, or at most a set of rich countries. When we imbed the data set 
from Tables 1 and 2 inside the larger data set, we can explicitly control for size and a 
Europe dummy to try to isolate where the big gap arises. 
What follows are step-by-step results leading from Micco, Ordonez and Stein up to 
the higher results (from the 15% effect to the tripling effect). We pursue the step-by-
step analysis in two different dimensions: first, we use the two samples that MSO use 
(developed countries and EU sample), as well as our full sample at every step to 
show what difference the sample makes. Second, we start with a sample for 1992-
2006 (this is the start-date of MSO, but their dataset stopped at 2001). We then 
expand this to our full dataset from 1948-2006 to see what difference the addition of 
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the earlier observations makes. We also show both fixed effects (with country-pair 
fixed effects and year effects) and OLS (with year fixed effects). 
Table 4A shows the estimation results, followed by the corresponding graph, for the 
first step: the 1992-2006 sample with only one dummy for EMU (no EMU-time 
interactions). We see that the euro effect exceeds 10% only when estimated within the 
EU sample. The estimates for the effect of the EMU on bilateral trade using the full 
sample or developed country sample are lower, around 6%, and they fail to be 
significant for the full sample. Using OLS instead of fixed effect estimators decreases 
the effect significantly for the full and developed country samples, but increases it to 
above 30% for the EU sample. 
Imbedding euro-based samples (with estimated impact on bilateral trade of 15%) within larger 
sample (with much higher estimates): 
Step-by-step breakdown of possible sources of gap 
 
Step 1: Recreate Micco, Stein & Ordonez (2003) starting in 1992 (as they do) - both with EMU 
Dummy only and with EMU – Time Interactions, Using our Full Sample, as well as the Developed 
Sample and EU Sample that MSO use. 
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Table 4A 
Just With EMU Dummy, no EMU-Time Interactions 
The Effect of Currency Unions on Trade: Recreating Micco, Stein & Ordonez (2003) With Our Data (1992-2006)
1992 - 2006, Fixed Effects Estimator with Countrypair and Year Fixed Effects, as well as OLS Estimator with Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Full Sample Developed Sample EU Sample
Log of Bilateral Trade Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS
Both Countries in Non-EMU Currency Union 0.575 0.752 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
(0.226)* (0.214)**
Both Countries in EMU 0.058 -0.017 0.06 -0.014 0.122 0.301
(0.100) (0.130) (0.018)** (0.095) (0.014)** (0.078)**
Free Trade Agreement (Non-EU) 0.155 1.116 0.046 0.013
(0.108) (0.153)** (0.026) (0.172)
Both Countries in EU -0.104 0.344
(0.120) (0.125)**
European Integration Trend 0.007 0.042 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.011
(0.008) (0.007)** (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)* (0.005)*
Log of Distance -1.292 -0.856 -1.125
(0.023)** (0.071)** (0.129)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs 1.206 1.033 0.648 0.774 0.399 0.667
(0.019)** (0.012)** (0.038)** (0.026)** (0.036)** (0.049)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita -0.057 0.38 0.362
(0.014)** (0.103)** (0.121)**
Common Language 0.41 0.069 -0.155
(0.049)** (0.161) (0.255)
Common Border 0.789 0.316 -0.036
(0.117)** (0.161) (0.147)
Number of Landlocked Countries in Pair -0.369 -0.382 -0.657
(0.034)** (0.100)** (0.115)**
Log of Product of Land Areas -0.08 0.018 0.13
(0.009)** (0.030) (0.055)*
Common Colonizer Post 1945 0.855
(0.079)**
Current Colony 1.21
(0.552)*
Ever Colony 1.218 0.521 0.725
(0.132)** (0.219)* (0.206)**
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 0.034 -0.003 -0.019 -0.048 0.001 0.005
(0.004)** (0.006) (0.003)** (0.021)* (0.003) (0.017)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.038 -0.006 0.002 -0.064 0.014 0.005
(0.012)** (0.005) (0.003) (0.017)** (0.003)** (0.014)
Constant -55.992 -34.46 -27.1 -35.659 -13.113 -29.645
(0.901)** (0.393)** (2.018)** (2.048)** (1.905)** (2.643)**
Observations 101,128 100,747 2,850 2,850 1,104 1,104
Number of id 9,576 190 78
R-squared 0.09 0.69 0.55 0.92 0.77 0.95
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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The following graph illustrates the results from the above table: 
The Effect of EMU on Trade: Different Estimators and Samples (1992-2006)
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Table 4B, and the corresponding graphs that follow, remain in the 1992-2006 sample 
time frame, but add EMU-year interaction terms to the specification so that we can 
follow the evolution of the euro’s effect over time. We can recreate (as we did above) 
the MSO results for the developed and EU samples that they used: Estimates are 
significant during the euro period.19 The effect of the euro on trade rises steadily 
from 1998, reaching the statistically significant level of .15-.17 in 2001-2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19  The reader should not be confused by the EMU-year interactive effects in the OLS column, 
which in most years can be taken to be essentially zero.   The coefficient to focus on is the dummy 
“Both Countries in EMU,” which is a highly significant .354.   One needs to add this coefficient to 
the year estimates.  Look at the bar charts in the figures to see this.   In 1996, the .354 coefficient 
is almost knocked out by the significant negative year effect.  Thereafter, it dominates. 
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Table 4B 
Step 1 including EMU – Time Interactions (1992-2006 Sample Period) 
The Effect of Currency Unions on Trade: Recreating Micco, Stein & Ordonez (2003) With Our Data (1992-2006)
1992 - 2006, Fixed Effects Estimator with Countrypair and Year Fixed Effects, as well as OLS Estimator with Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Full Sample Developed Sample EU Sample
Log of Bilateral Trade Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS
EMU * 1993 -0.105 -0.192 -0.037 -0.05 -0.019 -0.033
(0.227) (0.047)** (0.041) (0.029) (0.047) (0.039)
EMU * 1994 -0.196 -0.215 -0.032 -0.138 -0.005 -0.182
(0.245) (0.098)* (0.042) (0.053)** (0.042) (0.074)*
EMU * 1995 -0.093 -0.026 -0.027 -0.144 -0.014 -0.203
(0.237) (0.102) (0.042) (0.052)** (0.042) (0.080)*
EMU * 1996 -0.104 -0.064 -0.037 -0.153 -0.026 -0.211
(0.242) (0.106) (0.042) (0.055)** (0.042) (0.079)**
EMU * 1997 0.144 0.144 -0.021 -0.132 -0.007 -0.182
(0.246) (0.109) (0.042) (0.057)* (0.042) (0.076)*
EMU * 1998 0.166 0.104 0.034 -0.087 0.046 -0.133
(0.254) (0.122) (0.043) (0.064) (0.042) (0.078)
EMU * 1999 0.212 0.195 0.034 -0.221 0.072 -0.119
(0.254) (0.123) (0.043) (0.078)** (0.043) (0.085)
EMU * 2000 0.163 0.146 0.013 -0.244 0.078 -0.116
(0.256) (0.122) (0.044) (0.080)** (0.043) (0.085)
EMU * 2001 0.046 0.077 0.078 -0.304 0.171 -0.049
(0.261) (0.127) (0.044) (0.089)** (0.043)** (0.086)
EMU * 2002 -0.002 0.045 0.058 -0.329 0.147 -0.072
(0.261) (0.131) (0.044) (0.091)** (0.043)** (0.091)
EMU * 2003 0.112 0.175 0.12 -0.27 0.17 -0.047
(0.260) (0.133) (0.044)** (0.093)** (0.043)** (0.092)
EMU * 2004 0.105 0.21 0.121 -0.266 0.176 -0.038
(0.258) (0.131) (0.044)** (0.094)** (0.043)** (0.095)
EMU * 2005 -0.036 0.016 0.051 -0.331 0.13 -0.079
(0.262) (0.135) (0.044) (0.099)** (0.043)** (0.095)
EMU * 2006 -0.118 -0.08 0.028 -0.359 0.102 -0.107
(0.262) (0.136) (0.044) (0.102)** (0.043)* (0.100)
Both Countries in Non-EMU Currency Union 0.576 0.752
(0.226)* (0.214)**
Both Countries in EMU -0.177 0.273 0.354
(0.155) (0.101)** (0.109)**
Free Trade Agreement (Non-EU) 0.166 1.117 0.051 0.026
(0.108) (0.153)** (0.027) (0.172)
Both Countries in EU 0.209 -0.069 0.014 0.361
(0.183) (0.146) (0.031) (0.131)**
European Integration Trend 0.008 0.035 0 0.003 0.005 0.011
(0.010) (0.008)** (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)* (0.004)*
Log of Distance -1.292 -0.845 -1.112
(0.023)** (0.071)** (0.135)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs 1.205 1.033 0.645 0.774 0.412 0.669
(0.019)** (0.012)** (0.038)** (0.026)** (0.036)** (0.051)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita -0.057 0.407 0.39
(0.014)** (0.104)** (0.121)**
Common Language 0.409 0.076 -0.118
(0.050)** (0.161) (0.259)
Common Border 0.79 0.32 -0.04
(0.117)** (0.161)* (0.150)
Number of Landlocked Countries in Pair -0.369 -0.397 -0.668
(0.034)** (0.101)** (0.117)**
Log of Product of Land Areas -0.08 0.015 0.129
(0.009)** (0.030) (0.056)*
Common Colonizer Post 1945 0.855
(0.079)**
Current Colony 1.21
(0.553)*
Ever Colony 1.219 0.507 0.701
(0.132)** (0.220)* (0.205)**
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 0.034 -0.003 -0.018 -0.051 0.001 -0.001
(0.004)** (0.006) (0.003)** (0.021)* (0.003) (0.016)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.037 -0.006 0.004 -0.071 0.013 -0.007
(0.013)** (0.005) (0.003) (0.017)** (0.003)** (0.014)
Constant -55.96 -34.464 -26.966 -36.249 -13.838 -30.58
(0.901)** (0.393)** (2.009)** (2.114)** (1.880)** (2.724)**
Observations 101,128 100,747 2,850 2,850 1,104 1,104
Number of id 9,576 190 78
R-squared 0.09 0.69 0.56 0.92 0.78 0.95
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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The following two graphs illustrate the results from the above table (the first one for 
the fixed effects estimates and the second one for the OLS estimates: 
 
 
The Effect of EMU on Bilateral Trade: Recreating Micco, Stein & Ordonez 
(2003) with our Data: Fixed Effects Estimators
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(2003) with our Data: OLS Estimators
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Full Sample OLS Developed Sample OLS EU Sample OLS
Jeffrey Frankel 
 
                                                                                                                                      
23 
We have added four years to the sample, relative to the initial round of studies. The 
euro effect remains in the same range, and statistically significant. But it does not 
continue to increase over the period 2002-2006. For the author, the most surprising 
finding of this study was the absence of any evidence that the effects of the euro on 
bilateral trade have continued to rise during the second half of the eight-year history 
of the euro. This seems counter to historical experience in other countries with lags in 
bilateral trade effects from both currency union entries/exits and other factors.    
The results become less clear when we apply the specification to the full sample of 
countries. (The effect appears slightly negative for the years 1993-1996, jumps up in 
1997, and becomes negative again in 2005-2006; but none of these estimates is 
significant in the full sample.)20 This might seem to justify the M-O-S strategy of 
having confined their estimation to samples of EU and developed countries, under 
the logic that developing countries are too different to be useful.  The most important 
point to note for our purposes, however, is that the coefficient on non-EMU currency 
unions remains a significant .75 (under OLS 21). The exponential of .75 is 2.1, so this is 
a doubling of bilateral trade. The existence of the gap between small estimates for the 
euro (not even significant in this sample) and big estimates for other monetary 
unions is still very much in evidence. But we need a longer time sample if we want to 
obtain more reliable estimates and sharpen our standard errors. 
Table 5A and the subsequent graph show step 2: we now expand the dataset to 1948-
2006, which covers almost 60 years of data. The graph reveals that a crucial differ-
ence between MSO and broader estimates was the sample size. While estimates of 
the euro’s effect on trade continue to linger around 10-25% for the developed and EU 
samples that MSO used, they have climbed dramatically to .9-1.0 for the full sample, 
which exponentially is 2.5-2.7 -- almost tripling. All these estimates are highly 
significant, now that we have more data with which to work. We have uncovered the 
                                                        
20 When we use OLS, estimates are positive only for the developed and EU samples, but seem 
strange - for the EU sample, they start rather high in 1993, decrease slightly until 1996, and then 
take off again until a high in 2004, and only 1994-1997 are significant. 
21 It loses some luster under fixed effects;  but  this is perhaps to be expected since there are only 
15 years of observations and much of the variation in the data is eaten up by fixed effects and 
interactive year dummies. 
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possibility that the large gap is an artefact of the largely non-overlapping historical 
periods analyzed in the Rose and M-O-S studies (pre- and post-1999, respectively).  
Interestingly, the estimated trade effects of the euro are now even larger and more 
significant than the trade effects of non-EMU currency unions, rather than the other 
way around. Moreover, for those concerned with the van Wincoop view that the 
gravity specification used here overstates what would be the percentage effect of 
joining (or leaving) a monetary union, it is worth noting that the estimated coefficient 
of EMU is larger than that on the EU or other FTAs, and this is a comparison that 
stands up with fixed country effects. 
Step 2: Expand the sample period to 1948-2006. 
Table 5A: Just with EMU Dummy, no EMU – Time Interactions 
The Effect of Currency Unions on Trade: Full Data from 1948 with EMU Dummy
1948 - 2006, Fixed Effects Estimator with Countrypair and Year Fixed Effects, as well as OLS Estimator with Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Full Sample Developed Sample EU Sample
Log of Bilateral Trade Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS
Both Countries in Non-EMU Currency Union 0.746 0.309 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
(0.188)** (0.244)
Both Countries in EMU 0.93 1.005 0.097 -0.076 0.12 0.241
(0.116)** (0.097)** (0.014)** (0.094) (0.013)** (0.077)**
Free Trade Agreement (Non-EU) 0.662 0.794 0.057 0.097
(0.085)** (0.184)** (0.012)** (0.117)
Both Countries in EU 0.042 0.187
(0.096) (0.076)*
European Integration Trend -0.005 0.009 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.006
(0.009) (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.002)* (0.001) (0.003)
Log of Distance -1.043 -0.861 -1.105
(0.032)** (0.061)** (0.123)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs 1.592 0.819 0.513 0.795 0.376 0.678
(0.015)** (0.015)** (0.020)** (0.025)** (0.024)** (0.050)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita -0.009 0.164 0.248
(0.018) (0.094) (0.132)
Common Language 0.296 0.011 -0.181
(0.067)** (0.152) (0.235)
Common Border 0.664 0.337 0.015
(0.139)** (0.148)* (0.130)
Number of Landlocked Countries in Pair -0.391 -0.448 -0.64
(0.046)** (0.088)** (0.117)**
Log of Product of Land Areas -0.071 -0.006 0.119
(0.012)** (0.028) (0.056)*
Common Colonizer Post 1945 0.678
(0.098)**
Current Colony -0.254
(0.234)
Ever Colony 1.023 0.529 0.69
(0.142)** (0.222)* (0.194)**
Same Nation 0.457
(0.626)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.071 -0.006 -0.028 -0.065 -0.007 -0.008
(0.005)** (0.008) (0.002)** (0.023)** (0.003)* (0.018)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.018 -0.001 -0.005 -0.08 0.011 -0.016
(0.012) (0.008) (0.002)* (0.017)** (0.002)** (0.014)
Constant -72.821 -25.903 -19.917 -32.311 -11.718 -28.14
(0.713)** (0.499)** (1.050)** (1.750)** (1.264)** (2.465)**
Observations 166,990 166,609 5,130 5,130 1,601 1,601
Number of id 10,590 190 78
R-squared 0.13 0.43 0.65 0.92 0.81 0.95
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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The following graph illustrates the above results for the sample period 1948-2006: 
 
There appears to be much useful information from including all 60 years of available 
data in addition to including developing countries in the entire sample, rather than 
restricting ourselves to post-1992 observations of European or rich countries. Esti-
mates such as those for the coefficients on common border or common language shift 
substantially when the more complete data set is brought to bear. Only by using the 
entire sample can we uncover large short-term effects, over 100% when using fixed 
effects estimation. Second, the trade effects in the year before a monetary union 
formally goes into operation are even larger, and apply equally to EMU as to other 
monetary unions.  
Table 5B continues the analysis of the full 60-year data set, but now adds interaction 
effects between EMU and years before and after entry, and the same for Non-EMU 
monetary unions. We aggregate over each 5-year interval, to cut down on the loss of 
degrees of freedom and because it is implausible to think that there are sharp 
changes between, say, effects in years 19 and 20. The corresponding graphs show the 
interaction effects both for non-EMU currency unions and for EMU: The bar with 
horizontal stripes represents the full sample estimates for non-EMU currency union 
interactions with "1 yr prior to CU entry", "1-5 yrs post", "6-10 yrs post", "11-15 yrs 
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post", "16-20 yrs post", "21-25 yrs post", "26-30 yrs post". The other three bars 
represent the estimates for the interaction terms of EMU with different years prior 
and post EMU entry, based on the three different sample sizes (full: vertical stripes, 
developed: solid black, EU: diagonal stripes). As there are no non-EMU currency 
unions in the developed sample, we only have the full sample estimate for the non-
EMU currency union interactions with time.  
Table 5B 
Step 2 With Non-EMU Currency Unions and EMU-Time Interactions (1948-
2006)
The Effect of Currency Unions on Trade: 1948-2006 Data and Currency Union and EMU - Time Interactions
1948 - 2006, Fixed Effects Estimator with Countrypair and Year Fixed Effects, as well as OLS Estimator with Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Full Sample Developed Sample EU Sample
Log of Bilateral Trade Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects OLS
1 Year Prior to Non-EMU Currency Union Entry 1.102 1.823
(1.228) (0.160)**
1-5 Years Post Non-EMU Currency Union Entry 0.849 2.36
(0.444) (0.917)*
6-10 Years Post Non-EMU Currency Union Entry -0.048 0.713
(0.397) (1.010)
11-15 Years Post Non-EMU Currency Union Entry -1.049 0.388
(0.381)** (0.843)
16-20 Years Post Non-EMU Currency Union Entry -1.351 0.274
(0.376)** (0.874)
21-25 Years Post Non-EMU Currency Union Entry -1.911 -0.094
(0.383)** (0.383)
26-30 Years Post Non-EMU Currency Union Entry -1.127 0.342
(0.383)** (0.425)
1 Year Prior to EMU Entry 0.563 0.939 0.074 0.223 0.052 0.23
(0.234)* (0.099)** (0.025)** (0.069)** (0.023)* (0.071)**
1-5 Years Post EMU Entry 0.018 -0.024 -0.048 -0.049 -0.176
(0.171) (0.032) (0.019)** (0.017)** (0.049)**
6-10 Years Post EMU Entry 0.181
(0.042)**
Both Countries in Non-EMU Currency Union 0.907 0.237
(0.197)** (0.264)
Both Countries in EMU 0.767 1.001 0.115 -0.08 0.169 0.451
(0.167)** (0.111)** (0.019)** (0.101) (0.019)** (0.097)**
Free Trade Agreement (Non-EU) 0.485 0.735 0.078 0.1
(0.082)** (0.182)** (0.012)** (0.108)
Both Countries in EU 0.451 0.052 0.1 0.13
(0.116)** (0.109) (0.012)** (0.081)
European Integration Trend 0.032 0.012 -0.002 -0.007 0.012 0.001
(0.010)** (0.004)** (0.001) (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)
Log of Distance -1.045 -0.852 -1.078
(0.032)** (0.059)** (0.117)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs 0.114 0.823 0.525 0.801 0.401 0.699
(0.044)* (0.015)** (0.019)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.046)**
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita 1.5 -0.011 0.147 0.256
(0.042)** (0.018) (0.092) (0.132)
Common Language 0.307 0.019 -0.111
(0.067)** (0.144) (0.229)
Common Border 0.655 0.348 0.052
(0.138)** (0.145)* (0.135)
Number of Landlocked Countries in Pair -0.393 -0.494 -0.709
(0.046)** (0.084)** (0.115)**
Log of Product of Land Areas -0.074 -0.022 0.071
(0.012)** (0.027) (0.048)
Common Colonizer Post 1945 0.67
(0.098)**
Current Colony -0.258
(0.235)
Ever Colony 1.006 0.499 0.595
(0.141)** (0.211)* (0.170)**
Same Nation 0.44
(0.623)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.029 -0.007 -0.027 -0.069 -0.007 -0.003
(0.005)** (0.008) (0.002)** (0.023)** (0.003)* (0.017)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 0.073 0 -0.003 -0.085 0.012 -0.008
(0.012)** (0.008) (0.002) (0.017)** (0.003)** (0.015)
Constant -27.662 -25.806 -20.545 -31.916 -12.921 -28.439
(1.537)** (0.495)** (1.037)** (1.721)** (1.336)** (2.548)**
Observations 168,174 168,174 5,326 5,326 1,628 1,628
Number of id 10,739 210 91
R-squared 0.14 0.43 0.66 0.92 0.80 0.94
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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The following graphs illustrate the above results (the first graph for fixed effects esti-
mators and the second for OLS estimators): 
The Effect of Non-EMU Currency Unions and of EMU on Bilateral Trade over 
Time:
Fixed Effects Estimators
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The central puzzle addressed by this paper, the huge discrepancy between the euro 
effects to date and other monetary unions, seems to be sharply diminished here. It is 
true that in the one year prior to monetary union, the apparent effect is huge for non-
euro monetary unions and that also in the first five years it is several times larger. 
Perhaps reverse causality is a particular problem in these cases. But in years 6-10, the 
difference between EMU and non-euro currency unions is much smaller. 
That the trade effects fail to rise in years 6-10 relative to years 1-5 turns out to apply 
to other currency unions as much as to EMU, in fact more so. To help decide whether 
this is telling us that the long-run effect is reached within five years, we need to look 
at the out-years for the non-EMU cases (since, again, there are no EMU observations 
out farther than ten years). The long-run effects depend entirely on whether one 
looks at fixed-effects or simple OLS results. Under fixed effects, the impact of 
currency unions continues to decline after 10 years (and in fact appears to go 
negative). Perhaps this has something to do with decreasing effects of colonial 
legacies. When using OLS instead of fixed effects, the estimated effects remain 
positive throughout the period (but fail to be significant, and even at the 30-year 
mark do not rise above the effect in the first 10 years). We have not thought of a 
reason for this discrepancy. But there is no evidence here that any of the observed 
euro-noneuro discrepancy in estimates is due to lags. 
 
13. A natural experiment to isolate causality 
The problem of endogeneity is probably the most serious stumbling block in 
interpreting the Rose findings as a causal relationship between the currency decision 
and trade patterns. Even when one controls for many other determinants of bilateral 
trade – geographic, historical, linguistic – one can’t escape entirely from the concern 
that there are missing variables that determine bilateral trade, and that the currency 
regime decision in turn reacts to trade, rather than the other way around. The OLS 
results reported in the previous section may give cause for worry that the high 
correlations in the year before monetary union, and in the five years after, are due to 
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reverse causality, that the Eastern Caribbean countries form a currency union 
because their trade with each other is increasing, rather than the other way around.22 
One way to address the causality problem is before-and-after case studies. There are 
a few uni-observational case studies. One example is the case of Ireland. Thom and 
Walsh (2002) focus on Ireland’s abandonment of pound sterling in 1979; Dwane, 
Lane and McIndoe (2006) include also Ireland’s adoption of the euro in 1999. There 
are strong trends in the share of Irish trade, away from the UK and toward euroland.   
But it is not possible statistically to discern effects of the two currency changes 
independently of the effects of Ireland’s earlier accession to the EC or of the longer 
term trend.23      
Another example is the Czech-Slovak breakup of 1993, which had a substantial 
negative effect on bilateral trade.24 It is viewed as more supportive of the Rose effect, 
apparently because a customs union was retained. But we know that political 
borders such as the one that divided the new Czech and Slovak Republics at the 
same time that the two adopted separate currencies have effects at least as large as 
conventional trade barriers.   
As noted, Glick and Rose (2002) put together a huge data set covering the entire post-
war period, which includes enough additional examples like the breaking of the 
Irish-pound link and Czech-Slovak link to get statistical significance out of the time 
series dimension. Indeed, they are able to do so even when including pair-specific 
dummies, thereby giving up the power in the cross-section variation. The beauty of 
fixed effects is indeed that they take account of time-invariant facts, observed or 
unobserved; so Glick and Rose’s still significant results are very persuasive. As usual, 
                                                        
22 I have a harder time, however, seeing how such reverse causality could explain the results with 
fixed effects, or the Glick-Rose estimates. 
23 The case examined is potentially one of the more important ones, as Ireland is one of the 
largest countries in the sample of countries that entered or left a currency union in the period 
between the 1960s and 1999.  But the lack of statistically significant findings is probably to be 
expected, given the other ongoing developments and the very small number of data points. 
24  Frankel (1997, 121-122), Fidrmuc, Horvath, and Fidrmuc (1999), Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 
(2001). 
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the authors try lots of robustness checks. This might have been enough to satisfy the 
hard-line sceptics.25  
But it was not.  For one thing, most of the Glick-Rose results are not only from small 
countries, but also from instances of currency unions breaking up rather than 
forming, so that one cannot be sure that they apply equally to an example of large 
countries uniting in a currency union. For another thing, the decision to join a 
currency union, including the decision by Ireland or Slovenia to join EMU, could be 
misleadingly correlated with a shift in trade patterns toward continental Europe, 
either because: 
• such a shift is a political goal, encouraged by other means as well, or 
• trade is shifting in this direction for natural economic reasons, and policy-
makers want to reduce foreign exchange costs for importers and exporters. 
It would be useful to try some more real-time experiments. A useful comparison 
would be among the Nordic countries: Finland (which joined the euro along with the 
EU, while suffering an exogenous loss of trade with the Soviet Union after 1990), 
Sweden (which joined the EU but not the euro) and Norway (which has joined 
neither). But even if these interesting experiments were to produce the finding that 
the euro-joiners experienced increased bilateral trade with euroland, relative to the 
others, the critics could still plausibly claim endogeneity. Perhaps Finland joined the 
euro as a result of stronger political commitments to European integration than the 
others had, and perhaps this commitment is reflected in other trade-reallocating 
forces that are not the causal result of the euro itself. Another useful experiment 
would be to compare those Central and Eastern European countries that have chosen 
to tie their currencies rigidly to the euro, such as Estonia, with those who have opted 
for flexibility, such as the Czech Republic. It might also be interesting to look at the 
                                                        
25 I don’t agree with the admonishment (e.g., Tenreyo, 2004) that they should try all the 
robustness checks at the same time, rather than one by one.   One-by-one is the way to keep the 
volume of output manageable.   Furthermore, I don’t see as interesting an algorithm that checks 
whether trying every possible permutation can eventually produce some equation in which the 
currency union coefficient loses significance.     
Jeffrey Frankel 
 
                                                                                                                                      
31 
case of Switzerland, the one country in the heart of Europe never to join the EU or 
EMU despite sharing borders and languages with four countries. 
We here propose a sort of “natural experiment” designed to be as immune as 
possible from this sort of endogeneity argument. The experiment is the effect on 
bilateral trade of African CFA members of the French franc’s 1999 conversion to the 
euro. The long-time link of CFA currencies to the French franc has clearly always had 
a political motivation. So, CFA trade with France could not in the past reliably be 
attributed to the currency link, perhaps even after controlling for common language, 
and former colonial status. But with the advent of the euro, 14 CFA countries woke 
up in the morning and suddenly found themselves with the same currency link to 
Germany, Austria, Finland, Portugal, etc., as they had with France. There was no 
economic/political motivation on the part of the African countries that led them to an 
arrangement whereby they were tied to these other European currencies. Thus if 
CFA trade with these other European countries has risen, that suggests a euro effect 
that we can declare causal. 
Table 6A reports results. The dummy variable representing when one partner is a 
CFA country and the other a euro country has a highly significant coefficient of .57.   
Taking the exponent, the point estimate is that the euro boosted bilateral trade 
between the relevant African and European countries by 76%.  Table 6B looks at the 
effects over time. The apparent timing of the effect is partly supportive, though only 
partly. Its gradual rise during the 1980s and then loss of significance after 1991 
matches the contemporaneous progress of European monetary integration and the 
abrupt crisis in the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. The somewhat stronger trade 
results that begin again in 1997 match well the pattern of the final implementation of 
EMU that we saw among the euro countries themselves. The estimated effect in 1999 
is a big 96 per cent.26 The puzzle is the loss of significance in the last two years of the 
sample, 2005-06.    
 
                                                        
26  exp (.508+.165)=1.9601.   
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The CFA Experiment 
 
Table 6A 
CFA Experiment: The Impact of EMU on Bilateral Trade between CFA and EMU 
Members  With Year Interactions, 1948-2006 (without distance) 
 
CFA Natural Experiment: The Impact of EMU on Trade Between CFA and EMU Countries
1948 - 2006, OLS Estimator with Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Trade
Currency Union 1.706***
(0.385)
EMU 0.917***
(0.132)
Both Countries in European Union -0.275
(0.206)
Both Countries in CFA Franc Area (West and Central African) -0.731*
(0.438)
One Country in CFA Franc Area, the Other in EMU 0.572***
(0.119)
Log of Product of Real GDPs 0.812***
(0.016)
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita -0.026
(0.019)
Common Language 0.355***
(0.073)
Common Land Border 2.507***
(0.134)
Free Trade Agreement 1.951***
(0.181)
Landlocked -0.265***
(0.049)
Log of Product of Land Areas -0.106***
(0.012)
Common Colonizer post 1945 0.765***
(0.106)
Currently in Colonial Relationship -0.527**
(0.230)
Ever in Colonial Relationship 1.036***
(0.151)
Same Nation/Perennial Colonies 0.462
(0.431)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.002
(0.008)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.004
(0.008)
Constant -34.079***
(0.456)
Observations 169,561
R-squared 0.40
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on countrypairs.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
The version of the CFA experiment reported in Table 6A and 6B does not control for 
distance. Distance is a relatively poor proxy for transport costs in the case of Africa, 
because the exports and imports of many of the countries have to travel routes 
overland to the nearest port and then by sea around the continent, routes that are far 
longer than indicated distance as the crow flies. For example, Mali, Niger and Chad 
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(all three of them members of the CFA zone) are as close to the centre of the euro-
zone as the corners of the euro-zone are to each other, and yet their actual transport 
distances to Europe are high. 
Table 6B 
The Impact of EMU on Bilateral Trade between CFA and EMU Members, 1948-
2006 (without distance) 
 
CFA Natural Experiment: The Impact of EMU on Trade Between CFA and EMU Countries
1948 - 2006, OLS Estimator with Year Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: Log of Bilateral Trade
Currency Union 1.710***
(0.386)
EMU 0.229*
(0.138)
Both Countries in European Union -0.137
(0.211)
Both Countries in CFA Franc Area (West and Central African) -0.726*
(0.439)
One Country in CFA Franc Area, the Other in EMU 0.165
(0.241)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1980 0.144
(0.094)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1981 (dropped)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1982 0.024
(0.082)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1983 0.184*
(0.097)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1984 0.324**
(0.130)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1985 0.345***
(0.121)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1986 0.437***
(0.135)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1987 0.414***
(0.151)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1988 0.467***
(0.141)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1989 0.313**
(0.151)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1990 0.234
(0.160)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1991 0.350*
(0.182)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1992 0.221
(0.159)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1993 0.186
(0.164)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1994 0.066
(0.163)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1995 0.237
(0.166)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1996 0.079
(0.158)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1997 0.640***
(0.226)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1998 0.549**
(0.222)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 1999 0.508**
(0.222)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2000 0.450**
(0.223)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2001 0.546**
(0.223)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2002 0.519**
(0.226)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2003 0.428*
(0.233)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2004 0.437*
(0.235)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2005 0.22
(0.238)
One Country in CFA, One Country in EMU x 2006 0.178
(0.246)
Log of Product of Real GDPs 0.813***
(0.016)
Log of Product of Real GDPs per capita -0.027
(0.019)
Common Language 0.358***
(0.073)
Common Land Border 2.515***
(0.134)
Free Trade Agreement 1.940***
(0.182)
Landlocked -0.267***
(0.049)
Log of Product of Land Areas -0.107***
(0.012)
Common Colonizer post 1945 0.770***
(0.106)
Currently in Colonial Relationship -0.493**
(0.229)
Ever in Colonial Relationship 1.004***
(0.149)
Same Nation/Perennial Colonies 0.46
(0.433)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 1 -0.003
(0.008)
Real Exchange Rate of Country 2 -0.006
(0.008)
Constant -34.094***
(0.457)
Observations 169,561
R-squared 0.40
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Note: Dummy for CFA-EMU country pairs takes on value 1 from 1999 onward 
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We have also tried the CFA natural experiment with the usual control for distance.  
The results for the case where all the other variables are retained are reported 
elsewhere.27 The overall pattern is the same as without distance, with respect to time 
pattern and significance, but the estimated magnitudes are somewhat lower: The 
coefficient on the dummy representing trade between CFA members and euro 
members again rises during the 1980s, loses significance in 1992 (the year of the ERM 
crisis), comes roaring back with a highly significant .78 in 1997 (two years before the 
first EMU year), stays strong through 2004, and then puzzlingly loses significance in 
2005-06. In 1999, CFA countries trade with euro countries an extra 47 per cent more 
than otherwise similar pairs of countries.28    
The list of explanatory variables has grown rather long. The author has never been 
that fond of the real exchange rate variables. Further, the dummy “currently in 
colonial relationship” seems to offer little, either ex ante or in practice, that is not 
already covered by the dummy “ever in colonial relationship” together with “same 
nation / perennial colonies”. In view of multicollinearity concerns, all three variables 
are dropped in the final tables reported in this paper. In Table 7A the dummy 
variable representing when one partner is a CFA country and the other a euro 
country has a highly significant coefficient of .38. Taking the exponent, the point 
estimate is that the euro boosted bilateral trade between the relevant African and 
European countries by 46%. Table 7B looks at the effects over time. The apparent 
timing of the effect coincides better with the advent of full EMU than before: It is not 
significant in the 1980s, but as before attains in 1997-2004 a highly significant effect 
that is in the vicinity of 50% per cent.29 The puzzle of lost significance in 2005-06 
remains.    
 
 
                                                        
27 Tables 8A and 8b of Working Paper 2009-0008, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 
Harvard University, April 2009. 
28 Exp (.623-.241) =1.4652. 
29  In 1999, exp (.623-.241)=1.47.   It is also worth noting that the effect on trade between two 
CFA members is not significantly less than for pairs that belong to other currency unions.    
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Table 7A 
CFA Experiment: The Impact of EMU on Bilateral Trade between CFA and EMU 
Members  With Year Interactions, 1948-2006 (with distance, but without real 
exchange rates) 
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Table 7B 
The Impact of EMU on Bilateral Trade between CFA and EMU Members, 1948-
2006 (with distance, but without real exchange rates) 
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Overall, it is striking that this natural experiment produces such strong estimates for 
the trade effects of an exogenous currency link. Evidently the findings of strong 
effects from currency links among small countries cannot be entirely attributed to the 
endogeneity of the decision to form a monetary union. 
 
14. Conclusion 
This paper seeks to explain the discrepancy between estimates of the euro’s effect on 
trade among members – about 15% in our results, as in those of earlier authors – and 
estimates of the effects of other earlier currency unions in large sample of countries – 
on the order of 200%. It examines three obvious suspects. First, lags. The euro is still 
very young. We do find an upward trend in the trade effect during 1999-2004; but 
surprisingly we find no tendency during 2005-2006 for the euro’s effect to have risen 
above the level that it had attained by 2004 (15%). Second, size. The European 
countries are much bigger than most of those who had formed currency unions in 
the past. But the effect of a currency union does not appear to diminish discernibly 
with country size. Third, endogeneity of the decision to adopt an institutional 
currency link. Perhaps the high correlations estimated in earlier studies were 
spurious, an artefact of reverse causality. But we examine the natural experiment of 
trade between CFA countries and (non-Francophone) euro members and find a 
strong switch that in this case is unlikely to be the artefact of an endogenous 
currency decision. In short, we find little evidence that any of these factors explains 
much of the gap, let alone all of it.    
What we find instead is a surprising new suspect: results reported here suggest that 
the discrepancy might stem from sample size. If one estimates the effects of the euro 
versus other monetary unions in a large sample that includes all countries and all 
years, thereby bringing to bear as much information as possible on questions such as 
the proper coefficients on common border and common language in a gravity model, 
then the effect of the euro in the first eight years appears to be large, even compa-
rable with the effect of the other non-euro monetary unions. It is hard to believe, 
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however, that the true effect of the euro has indeed been this large; if intra-euroland 
trade had doubled or tripled since 1999, we would see it in the raw data and would 
not need to run a regression. Perhaps it is best to summarize the conclusions of the 
paper by saying that each of the three obvious suspects – lags, size, and endogeneity 
– has an apparent alibi;  but the true perpetrator remains at large. 
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